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Aggression Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression,
Politicide And Other Crimes Against Human Rights
by Jordan J. Paust*
"The laying a Country desolate with Fire and Sword, declaring War
against the natural rights of all Mankind, and extirpating the De-
fenders thereof from the Face of the Earth, is the Concern of every Man
... So wrote the American revolutionary Thomas Paine in Febru-
ary of 1776. The war against human rights' of which he wrote had al-
ready led to the 1775 Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking
Up Arms, which had denounced Parliament's "cruel and impolitic pur-
pose of enslaving the [the colonials] .. .by violence . . .", the British
government's "intemperate rage for unlimited domination", acts of
"cruel aggression", and numerous "oppressive measures" that had re-
duced our political ancestors "to the alternative of chusing an uncondi-
tional submission to the tyranny of irritated ministers, or resistance by
force."3 As the world knows, our ancestors chose armed revolution as
the self-help sanction response to aggression against the authority of the
people,4 and our revolution served as a precursor for numerous others in
the Americas, Europe, and elsewhere, even into the twentieth century.5
Although the war against human rights and the crime of political
oppression led to no criminal sanctions against the King of England and
his retainers, an international trial would not have been completely un-
precedented. For the oppression of persons under his charge and actions
against the "laws of God and man," the Burgundian Peter von
* Professor of Law, University of Houston, Law Center. J.D. (1968), U.C.L.A.; LL.M. (1972),
University of Virginia; J.S.D. Candidate., Yale University.
I T. PAINE, COMMON SENSE Introduction (Feb. 14, 1776) reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL
THOMAS PAINE 23-24 (S. Hook ed. 1969).
2 That the Founders considered this and similar phrases to be the equivalent of the phrase
"human rights," see J. PAUST, ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHT PRECEPTS IN
U.S. HISTORY AND THE RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY IN DOMESTIC COURTS (forthcoming);
Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry Into Criteria and
Content, 27 How. L.J. 145, 221, 221 n.281 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Paust, Human Dignity].
3 Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms (1775) reprinted in SOURCES OF
OUR LIBERTIES 295, 297-99 (R. Perry ed. 1978).
4 See generally Paust, The Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and Related Forms
of Social Voilence: Testing the Limits of Permissibility, 32 EMORY L.J. 545 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Paust, The Human Right to Participate].
5 Id. at 547 n.6.
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Hagenbach was deprived of his knighthood and then executed with an
order, "Let justice be done." 6 The trial of von Hagenbach for the im-
proper administration of pledged territories on the Upper Rhine had oc-
curred at Breisach in 1474 at the order of the Archduke of Austria and
was presided over by twenty-eight judges from allied towns.7 Far more
frequently however, as today, the trial of violators of international law
has occurred domestically if at all.8
Presently, violations of international law are a legal concern of the
international community;9 nevertheless, the enforcement of criminal
sanctions is left primarily with the nation-state.'° This circumstance may
operate satisfactorily, given universal jurisdiction over the individual vio-
lators of international law," the lack of validity of any domestic statute
of limitation or other attempted grant of immunity,' 2 the lack of sover-
6 T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 81-82 (1970).
7 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, II. INTERNATIONAL LAW 462-66 (1968). At Naples in 1268, Con-
radin von Hohenstafen was executed after being tried for initiating an unjust war, thus setting the
first known precedent for criminal sanctions against what Paine might have rephrased as a war
against human rights. Bierzanek, The Prosecution of War Crimes in I. A TREATISE ON INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 559-60 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973). The propriety of military
action against a ruler who oppresses his or her people was also recognized later in the Seventeenth
Century. See, infra note 75, and accompanying text.
8 See e.g., Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L.
REV. 99, 108, 111-18, 184-85 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Paust, My Lai and Vietnam].
9 For a more complete discussion, see Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of
Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act
of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 221-25 (1983), and references cited therein [hereinafter
cited as Paust, Federal Jurisdiction].
10 Id. at 211-13, and references cited therein.
II Id.
12 See Paust, My Lai and Vietnam, supra note 8, at 120-22 and references cited therein. See
also, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 14, para. 2 (1948), reprinted in
HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE U.N., A/CONE.
32/4 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Declaration of Human Rights] (no asylum for "nonpolitical crimes
or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations"); La Jeune Eugenie, 26
F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,551) ("no nation can rightfully permit [a violation]
• . .no nation can privilege itself to commit a crime against the law of nations by a mere municipal
regulation of its own"); C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO Ex-
TRADITION 27 (1980). Bassiouni, An International Control Scheme for the Prosecution of Interna-
tional Terrorism in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 485, 487 (A. Evans & J.
Murphy eds. 1978); Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States: 1981-1983, 17 AKRON L.
REV. 495, 550 (1984), and references cited therein [hereinafter cited as Bassiouni, Extradition Re-
form Legislation,]; Garcia-Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition
and Asylum, 14 U. PITr. L. REV. 371, 390, 394 (1953) (war crimes and crimes against humanity are
not political offenses posing exceptions to extradition); Kittrie, Patriots and Terrorists: Reconciling
Human Rights With World Order, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 291, 298-302 (1981).
For this general reason and because international law is part of supreme federal law, the recent
district court decision in Artukovic was erroneous in recognizing a time limitation for civil sanctions
even though none are appropriate for criminal sanctions. Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F.Supp. 1421,
1429-31 (S.D. Cal. 1985). There is no time limitation mentioned in the Universal Declaration of
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eign immunity for violations of international law,13 and the lack of any
principle of double jeopardy concerning international crime.14 However,
reliance on state enforcement has proven to be inadequate in far too
many instances. 5 This inadequacy is especially apparent in the case of
aggression against authority and the crime of oppression when foreign
state elites find it convenient to tolerate violations of international law
while the domestic populace is unable to overthrow local tyrants who
feign to represent them.
When most of the governmental processes of the world are cat-
egorizable as being only partly free or nonfree,' 6 when martial law or
similar executive decrees are widespread and ban effective political par-
ticipation and opposition to insecure governmental elites,1 7 when the me-
dia are among the first to be restrained and cannot even report acts of
Human Rights and sanctions are to be universally available and effective. Declaration of Human
Rights, supra this note, at art. 8; M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 85 (1944) ("No statute
of limitations exists in international law to bar the presentation of disputes or claims .... "); Paust,
Human Dignity, supra note 2, at 186, 186 n.186. Even an attempted grant of asylum or pardon
should relate only to criminal sanctions and not to civil suits for recovery of stolen property or
damages. More importantly, any sort of attempt to grant immunity is impermissible under the per-
emptory norm of nonimmunity for international crime. On the recovery of property, see also note
101 infra.
13 See Paust, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 226-49, and references cited therein; Draft
Brief Concerning Claims to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunity for Vio-
lations of International Law Under the FSIA, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming). See also Jimenez v.
Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. deniedsub nom. Jimenez v. Hixon, 373 U.S.
914 (1963) (even "common crimes" of a dictator "were not acts of. . . . sovereignty," acts of state,
nor acts "in an official capacity" entitled to any sort of immunity, but were "crimes committed by
the Chief of State done in violation of his position" despite claim to the contrary).
14 See Paust, My Lai and Vietnam, supra note 8, at 121-22 and references cited therein; Paust,
Letter, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 508, 510-11 (1977). It is apparent that Article 14(7) of the 1966 Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights applies only to the domestic prosecution of a domestic offense. Article
15 applies to violations of both national and international law, unlike Article 14(7) which has no
references to offenses against international law. International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GOAR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6
I.L.M. 368, 373 (1967). What this means is that even after state X has convicted a person for an
international offense and such person has served time in a state X jail, if that person travels to state Y
(so that state Y has jurisdiction to enforce), state Y can also prosecute such person for a violation of
international law, affording the accused all human rights to due process that otherwise exist.
15 See Paust & Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh Experi-
ence, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 34-38 (1978); Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crimes
Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEX. L. REv. 6, 6-7 (1971) reprinted in IV
THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 447 (R. Falk ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Paust,
After My Lai].
16 See Paust, International Law and Control of the Media: Terror, Repression and the Alterna-
tives, 53 IND. L. J. 621, 632 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Paust, International Law and Control].
17 See Id at 633-62 (states and areas where emergency decrees or martial law have been im-
posed); International Commission of Jurists, States of Emergency: Their Impact on Human Rights, 9
YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1 (1982) (Symposium).
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oppression and crimes against authority, 8 such inadequacy is only exac-
erbated. If legitimate authority and self-determination are to be far more
widespread in the twenty-first century, greater attention must be paid to
the problem posed by aggression against authority and to various sanc-
tion strategies that can be employed to combat political oppression. One
obvious need involves further effort to clarify relevant prohibitions under
international law and to relate them to the crime of oppression or to
possible criminal sanctions against certain acts of political oppression.
I. AGGRESSION AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
The relatively recent effort of the United Nations General Assembly
(General Assembly) to define aggression and to reiterate its prohibition
under the United Nations Charter19 (U.N. Charter) is only partly ade-
quate to this task.2" It is useful in demonstrating certain proscribed ac-
tions directed "against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another state, '21 but it falls short of providing any fur-
Is See Paust, International Law and Control, supra note 16.
19 U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 1.
20 See Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1975). For more detailed discussions of attempts to define aggression see B. FERENCZ
DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION (1975); J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER
(1958); Bassiouni, The Definition of Aggression in International Law: The Crime Against Peace in I.
A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 159 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973); infra
notes 80-81 and accompanying text. Article 19(3)(a) of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
adopted by the International Law Commission, also recognized that aggression constitutes an exam-
ple of international crime that can result from "a serious breach of an international obligation of
essential importance for the maintenance of international peace .. " Report of the International
Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 10) 239, U.N.
Doc. A/34/10 (1979), reprinted in M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CON-
TEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 944, 947 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft Articles on State
Responsibility].
21 Definition of Aggression, supra note 20, at Annex, art. 1. See also id. at Annex, art. 3;
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protec-
tion of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. G.O.A.R Supp. (No. 14) at 11,
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966) (preamble states that "armed intervention is synonymous with aggres-
sion"). An interesting case in early U.S. history involved the trial and execution of two Englishmen,
Arbuthnot and Ambrister, in 1818 for the incitement of the Creek Indians and the levying of war
against the United States in violation of the law of nations and the law of war. Paust, My Lai and
Vietnam, supra note 8, at 113-15 and references cited therein. Professor Quincy Wright had also
recognized many examples of trials of persons "for initiating or contributing to the initiation of
aggressive war" prior to Nuremberg. Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
38, 63 n.102 (1947). See T. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 59-67 (discussing the historical development of
the laws of war and their enforcement). Also of historic interest is the 1810 decision of the Congress
of Aix-La-Chapelle to detain Napoleon for waging wars against the peace of the world. Bellot, The
Detention of Napoleon Bonaparte, 39 TEMP. L. REV. 170 (1923). When private individuals engaged
in similar conduct without the support of their state of nationality, such individuals were
prosecutable for violations of the law of nations and neutrality. See Henfield's Case, II F. Cases
1099, 1107-15, 1117, 1120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (Wilson, J., charge to grand jury and
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ther guidance concerning proscribed acts of aggression by a government
against its own people. The Resolution on the Definition of Aggression
calls upon all states to refrain from "all acts of aggression and other uses
of force contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and the Declara-
tion on Principles of International Law,"22 and reaffirms "the duty of
States not to use armed force to deprive peoples of their right to self-
determination .. ."23 It notes that nothing contained in the definition
"could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination. 
. . of peo-
ples forcibly deprived of that right. . . nor the right of these peoples to
struggle to that end and to seek and receive support. ,,,24 notes that
"the question whether an act of aggression has been committed must be
considered in the light of all the circumstances,"25 and notes that "acts
enumerated . . . are not exhaustive .. "26 Moreover, the definition
affirms that aggression also includes the use of armed force "in any other
manner [,than the proscribed attacks against another state, which is] in-
consistent with the Charter,"27 but does not provide further clarification.
Nonetheless, "[a] war of aggression," the Declaration affirms, "is a crime
against international peace."28 In this sense, the Declaration reaffirms
recognition in the authoritative 1970 Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law that "[a] war of aggression constitutes a crime against the
peace, for which there is responsibility under international law."2 9
Under the U.N. Charter,3" "the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" is pro-
scribed.31 As the Declaration on Principles of International Law affirms,
"[s]uch a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law
and the Charter.. ,"32 and is tied also to "the duty to refrain from any
forcible action which deprives peoples. . . of their right to self-determi-
indictment); 1 Op. Att'y. Gen. 68, 69 (1797); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795). See also infra notes 76-
77 and accompanying text.
22 Definition of Aggression, supra note 20, at § 3 (emphasis added).
23 Id. at Annex, preamble.
24 Id. at Annex, art. 7.
25 Id. at Annex, preamble, See also infra note 81 and accompanying text.
26 Definition of Aggression, supra note 20, at Annex, art. 4.
27 Id. at Annex, art. 1. On this point, see also U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
28 Definition of Aggression, supra note 20, at Annex, art. 5, para. 2.
29 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-oper-
ation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N.
GOAR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Declaration on Friendly Relations].
30 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
31 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 29.
32 Id.
1986]
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nation. . .. ,,3" Because article 1, paragraph 2, of the U.N. Charter rec-
ognizes respect for self-determination of peoples as a major purpose, and
because article 2, paragraph 4, prohibits the threat or use of force in any
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, it is clear
that the threat or use of force against the self-determination of a people
entitled to such right is proscribed by the Charter.
Other resolutions of the General Assembly have affirmed this inter-
connected prohibition and implicitly confirm that the use of force in vio-
lation of article 2(4) to deprive a people of self-determination constitutes
a crime against peace.34 In fact, the General Assembly has resolutely
condemned "all forms of oppression, tyranny and discrimination . . .
wherever they occur,"' 35 and has strongly condemned racism and all "to-
talitarian" ideologies and practices. The General Assembly stated that
such ideologies and practices:
which are based on terror and racial intolerance, are incompatible with
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and
constitute a gross violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
which may jeopardize world peace and the security of peoples. 36
With respect to the latter practices, the General Assembly has also called
upon all states to prosecute the perpetrators of such violations.37 More
recently, the International Law Commission has made an inviting recog-
nition that "an international crime may result . . . from . . . a serious
breach of an international obligation of essential importance for safe-
guarding the right of self-determination. .... ,,31 The Commission also
noted that "domination" of a people "by force" may constitute a crime
against self-determination. 39 This recognition can undoubtedly apply to
the use of force by a government to deprive a people of self-determination
and thus to engage in acts of "domination" and political oppression.
The right of a given people to political self-determination is also a
fundamental human right' ° and is interconnected necessarily with sev-
33 Id. In fact, the same language appears in the Declaration in connection with the principle
concerning the threat or use of force and the principle of self-determination.
34 Paust and Blaustein, supra note 15, at 30-31 and references cited therein. Professor Blau-
stein and I have agreed that such a use of force constitutes a crime against peace. Id. at 31. Others
undoubtedly have made a similar recognition. See infra, notes 38, 39, 48 and accompanying text.
35 Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, G.A. Res. 2734, 25 U.N. GOAR
(1932d plen. mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc A/RES/2734 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Security Strengthening
Declaration].
36 G.A. Res. 2545, 24 U.N. GOAR (1829th plen. mtg.) at I, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2545 (1969).
See also G.A. Res. 2438, 23 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 18) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res.
2331, U.N. GOAR (1638th plen. mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2331 (1967).
37 G.A. Res. 2545, supra note 36.
38 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 20, art. 19, para. 3(b).
39 Id.
40 See, e.g. Paust & Blaustein, supra note 15, at 18. Accord id. at 18 accompanying note 66.
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eral other important human rights, including the right of individuals
freely to participate in the political process.4" The respect for and obser-
vance of human rights is also a major purpose of the U.N.;4 2 and article
2, paragraph 4, of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force in any
manner "inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Thus, it
is clear that an additional interconnected basis exists for the proscription
of the threat or use of force against political self-determination. For a
similar reason, aggression against authority is proscribed by the U.N.
Charter.43
Under international law, the legitimate authority of a government
exists on the basis of the "will of the people" expressed through a rela-
tively full, free, and equal participation of individuals in the political pro-
cess.' Such a standard of authority is now entrenched in many
interrelated human rights and the precept of self-determination; each is
ultimately protected in the U.N. Charter and subsequent authoritative
decisions.45 When force is used to oppress individual or group participa-
tion in the political process and is used to change the dynamic outcome
of such a process identifiable in an aggregate will of individuals, such a
use of force constitutes an aggression against authority, human rights
and the process of self-determination. Hence, such a use of force violates
articles 1(2), 1(3), 2(4) and 56 of the U.N. Charter.46 It is among the
more odious of violations, posing a threat to several fundamental Charter
precepts, and can affect the rights of numerous victims - more numer-
ous in fact than the victims of ordinary violations of international law or
many other forms of international crime.
More recently, the General Assembly applied these international
precepts while condemning the governmental process of South Africa.
The General Assembly reaffirmed the need for the "establishment of a
non-racial democratic society based on majority rule, through the full
and free exercise of adult suffrage by all the people in a united and un-
fragmented South Africa;" and recognized the "legitimacy of. . .[the]
struggle [by the oppressed people of South Africa] to eliminate apartheid
and establish a society based on majority rule with equal participation by
41 See Paust, The Human Right to Participate, supra note 4, at 562-66 and references cited
therein.
42 U.N. CHARTER preamble, arts. 1(3), 55(c) and 56.
43 Id. at art. 2, para. 4.
44 See Paust, Authority: From a Human Rights Perspective, 28 AM. J. JURIS. 64, 67-72 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Paust, Authority]; Paust, Political Oppression in the Name of National Security:
Authority, Participation, and the Necessity Within Democratic Limits Test, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB.
ORD. 178, 179-87 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Paust, Political Oppression].
45 Paust, Political Oppression, supra note 44.
46 U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(2), 1(3), 2(4) and 56. See Paust & Blaustein, supra note 15, at 11-12
n.39, 30-31; Paust, Political Oppression, supra note 44, at 187.
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all the people of South Africa."47 The General Assembly, in its nearly
unanimous resolution, also condemned the South African "regime for
defying relevant resolutions of the United Nations and persisting with
the further entrenchment of apartheid, a system declared a crime against
humanity and a threat to international peace and security. '4 8 Such an
oppression of the authority of the people is a form of political slavery
that is not only violative of human rights and self-determination, but also
constitutes treason against humanity which should increasingly be recog-
nized as a crime of oppression and a crime against humanity.
II. OFFENSES AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS
A question arises whether violations of human rights are indepen-
dently sanctionable by criminal prosecution.49 Several international
scholars have recognized that criminal sanctions for violations of basic
human rights are entirely appropriate.50 In fact, it has long been ex-
pected more generally that violations of international law are subject to
both criminal and civil sanctions within the domestic legal process. 51 As
47 G.A. Res. 2, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 14-5, U.N. Doe. A/39/51, preamble, §§ 1, 2,
6, 39 (Sept. 28, 1984) (vote: 133-0-2). See also G.A. Res. 183L, 33 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 45) at
32, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (Jan. 24, 1979) (The General Assembly "[s]trongly condemns the illegiti-
mate minority racist regime of South Africa for its criminal policies and practices"); Paust, The
Illegality of Apartheid and the Present Government of South Africa (1985) (speech at A.B.A. An-
nual Meeting, Seminar on Legal Aspects of Apartheid, July 7, 1985), reprinted in 131 CONG. REC.
S16854 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Paust, Illegality of Apartheid].
48 G.A. Res. 2, supra note 47, at § 3. See G.A. Res. 183L, supra 47, and infra note 58. Article
19(3)(c) of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, adopted by the International Law Commis-
sion, also declares, "an international crime may result. . . from ... a serious breach on a wide-
spread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being,
such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid;" Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
supra note 20. It is suggested that aggression against authority and widespread political oppression
pose a similar threat and are actually interrelated with the process of apartheid in South Africa. See
also McCaffrey, Current Development Note, 79 AM. J. INT.L L. 755, 756 (1985). See M.McDOUGAL,
H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 523-30, 546-50 (1980);
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 20, at art. 19, para. 3(b) (crime against self-
determination).
49 Professor Blaustein and I have argued that they are subject to criminal sanctions. Paust &
Blaustein, supra note 15, at 29-31.
50 For example, Kutner, Reisman, Wright, Bassiouni and Derby. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction,
supra note 9, at 215, n.97. See also M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw-A DRAFT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE 30 n.31 (1980); supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. Fur-
ther, widespread violations of basic human rights seem especially suited for coverage under the In-
ternational Law Commission's criteria, supra note 48. Additionally, they are of "universal concern"
and subject to widespread condemnation within the ambit of criteria recognized in the Draft Re-
statement, infra note 78 and accompanying text; infra note 79. See also Paust, Federal Jurisdiction,
supra note 9, at 223 n.134; supra note 1 and accompanying text.
51 See J. PAUST, supra note 2; Paust, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 211-14. Early in our
history, Justice Wilson recognized that "infractions of... [the law of nations] form a part of...
[the common law] code of criminal jurisprudence," Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1107 (Wilson, J.
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noted in another study:
It is incorrect to categorically state that violations of human rights
may not be prosecuted as an international crime. Violations of human
rights intertwined with the law of armed conflict, genocide, and gen-
eral crimes against humanity can obviously result in state or interna-
tional tribunal prosecution. Criminal adjudication of human rights has
been sporadic due to the lack of an overall and effective sanctioning
process. Beyond the fact that numerous perpetrators of violations of
human rights during armed conflict have been punished, there have
been past instances of effective sanctioning against individuals for vio-
lations of other types of human rights--especially when an ad hoc
sanction process was expressly constituted under an international
agreement. 2
Interestingly, the United States, in response to a French denial of a
U.S. request for the extradition of two aircraft hijackers, characterized
the actions of the accused as "an offense against the human rights of
passengers and crew."53 It will not be surprising to see more references
to "offenses against. . . human rights" as the international community
pays greater attention to the full range of possible responses to violations
of international law and, particularly, to violations of basic human rights.
As previously recognized, a modern, post-Nuremberg problem involves
the application of the laws of armed conflict, genocide, the precept of
self-determination, and general human rights in various circumstances of
social violence. 4 Thus, violations of human rights, in times of relative
peace or armed conflict, might increasingly be responded to with crimi-
nal sanctions.
This is the trend with respect to treaties calling for domestic crimi-
nal sanctions against certain specific deprivations (whether or not human
rights are mentioned as such), such as unlawful kidnappings and the tak-
ing of hostages, 5 attacks on or the hijacking of civil aircraft,56 attacks on
charge to grand jury). The statement represents a common approach at the time and is broad
enough to cover any infraction, including a violation of human rights law.
52 Paust & Blaustein, supra note 15, at 29 (citations omitted).
53 1975 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 168, 171 (E. Mc-
Dowell ed. 1976) (U.S. Memorandum of Law, Apr. 3, 1975).
54 See Paust & Blaustein, supra note 15, at 38.
55 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by G.A. Res. 146,
34 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doe. A/34/46 (1980). [hereinafter cited as Hostages
Convention].
56 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabo-
tage), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192; Convention on
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941,
T.I.A.S. No. 6768.
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internationally protected persons, 5v the practice of apartheid,58 other acts
of impermissible terrorism 59 and other acts of impermissible racial dis-
crimination,6° and draft conventions, such as that on the prevention and
suppression of torture.61 Several studies also affirm a post-Nuremberg
interconnection between human rights law and newer developments in
the humanitarian law of armed conflict, 62 and one can expect greater
attention to human rights when the law of armed conflict is criminally
enforced.
III. GENOCIDE AND POLITICAL OPPRESSION
Acts of genocide directed against "a national, ethnical, racial or reli-
gious group, as such,",63 may be motivated by, or result in, the political
oppression of members of such groups and impermissibly interfere with
the process of authority and self-determination. To that extent, the cus-
57 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8632.
58 1974 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, adopted by G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1974). See also supra notes 47, 48.
59 1976 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Europ. T.S. No. 90 (1977).
1971 Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against
Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No.
8413; S.C. Res. 579 (1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 243 (Jan. 1986); G.A. Res. 40/61 (1985), reprinted
in 25 I.L.M. 239 (1985) ("Mindful of the necessity of maintaining and safeguarding the basic rights
of the individual in accordance with the relevant international human rights instruments . . . un-
equivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism whenever and by
whomever committed .. "); 1972 Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism
which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, G.A.
Res. 3034, U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 30) at 119, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1973). On the relationship
between human rights and impermissible terrorism see LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TER-
RORISM (A. Evans & J. Murphy eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as A. Evans & J. Murphy]; Paust,
Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 214-15.
60 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
art. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
61 1978 Draft Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Torture, U.N. Doc. E/CN.
4/NGO 213; Declaration on the Prosecution of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A.
Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975). See also Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d. 876, 882-83 (2d. Cir. 1980); M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 50, at 82-84.
62 See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 50, at 43; M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN supra
48, at 181 n.55; NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (A. Cassese ed. 1979); Draper,
Human Rights and the Law of War, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 326 (1972) (extended discussion of the
interconnection between human rights law and the humanitarian law of armed conflict); Paust &
Blaustein, supra note 15, at 15-18 and references cited therein; Symposium, 33 AM. U.L. REV. No. 1
(1983).
63 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art.
2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 [hereinafter cited as Genocide Convention]. Genocide is a crime whether
perpetrated in the time of relative peace or war. Id. at art. 1.
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tomary prohibition of genocide,64 with concomitant universal enforce-
ment jurisdiction,65 can be useful in opposing aggression against
authority and political oppression. Additionally, it does not matter that
such attacks happen to coincide with attacks on "political" groups.6 6 At-
tacks on the groups specified in the treaty and which are motivated by, or
result in, political oppression of such persons can be criminally sanc-
tioned. Moreover, today it can be recognized that whether or not attacks
on "political" groups as such involve acts of genocide, such attacks are
necessarily violative of the precept of self-determination and fundamental
human rights. As such, they constitute aggression against authority, a
64 I share the viewpoint that the prohibition of genocide now at least is customary. See Case
Concerning The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd., (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3,
paras. 33-34 (Judgment of February 5); G.A. Res. 96, 1 U.N. GOAR at 189, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.
1 (1946) reprinted in [1946-1947] U.N. Y.B. 255 (unanimously affirming that genocide already "is a
crime under international law"); Genocide Convention, supra note 63, at preamble ("genocide is a
crime under international law"), art. 1 ("The Contracting parties confirm that genocide . . . is a
crime under international law") (emphasis added); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN,
supra note 48, at 215, 355-56 Edwards, Contributions of the Genocide Convention to the Development
ofInternationalLaw, 8 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 300, 305-06, 308-09 (1981), Paust & Blaustein, supra note
15, at 22-23, ns.76-77; Comment, The United States and the 1948 Genocide Convention, 16. HARV.
INT'L L.J. 683 (1975). But see Starkman, Genocide and International Law: Is There a Cause of
Action?, 8 A.S.I.L.S. INT'L L.J. 1, 13-21 (1984). The new Draft Restatement also adopts this view.
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, TENTATIVE DRAFT
No. 6 § 404 and Reporter's note 1 thereto, § 702(a) and Comment d and Reporter's note 3 thereto
(A.L.I. 1985) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT RESTATEMENT].
65 As a customary prohibition, there is now universal enforcement jurisdiction. DRAFT RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 64, at § 404 and Reporter's Note thereto, and Reporter's Note 3 to § 702(a);
M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 48, at 215, 354-56; Paust, Federal Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 9, at 211-13, 224, 224 n. 136; Paust & Blaustein, supra note 15, at 20-21. Article 6 of
the Genocide Convention does not state that persons charged with genocide must (or shall) only be
charged and tried in a state in which the alleged acts take place-the customary competence of all
states to prosecute is certainly broader and in the future, Article 6 should be interpreted consistently
with custom in the case of any ambiguity. Id. at 21 n.72. See also Attorney General of the Govern-
ment of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 33 (D.C. Jerusalem 1962), afl'd. 36 I.L.R. 277 (S. Ct. of
Israel 1962). On this last point, Arthur Goldberg and Richard Gardner have also noted that it is
recognized in "an agreed interpretation of Article VI which is contained in the relevant U.N. com-
mittee report, [that Article VI] 'does not affect the right of any State to bring to trial before its own
tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside the state.'" Goldberg & Gardner, Time to
Act on the Genocide Convention, 58 A.B.A.J. 141, 143 (1972) (quoting J. ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION-A COMMENTARY 83-84 (1960)). See also L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 977-978, 985 (1973); Starkman, supra note 64, at 47, 50.
66 See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 50, at 72; P. DROsT, II THE CRIME OF STATE: GENOCIDE 62
(1959); L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 65, at 929. Although the United States favored
inclusion of an express category of'political' group within article 2 of the Genocide Convention, and
such was included in the 1946 General Assembly resolution on Genocide, such a catagory was
dropped later in order to gain a quicker and more widespread ratification. Comment, Genocide: A
Commentary on the Convention, 58 YALE L.J. 1142, 1145 (1949). Early in 1986, the U.S. Senate
voted 93 to 1 in favor of a resolution directing the President to seek renewed negotiations concerning
inclusion of political groups within those specified in the Genocide Convention. See Washington
Weekly Report, vol. 12, No. 7, at 3 (UNA-USA Feb. 21, 1986).
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violation of the U.N. Charter, the crime of oppression, 67 and what the
International Law Commission has recognized as a crime against self-
determination. To the extent that violations of relevant human rights are
criminally sanctioned, any gap in coverage by the Genocide Convention
will prove to be of little import.
Nevertheless, it may be important to emphasize these recognitions
in a new international instrument, if only to further sanctify criminal
proscription and to provide additional guidance concerning the contours
of present prohibitions. For that purpose, a draft Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Politicide is offered in the annex
to this article. Politicide, as a useful rallying term, can encompass more
odious forms of aggression against authority, the crime against self-deter-
mination, the crime of political oppression, and so forth, while providing
a logically related focus in supplementation of the Genocide Convention.
IV. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY RECONSIDERED
The Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment recognize
that crimes against humanity include:
[M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman
acts done against any civilian population, or persecution on political,
racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecu-
tions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime
against peace or any war crime.
6 8
Since the crime includes acts done against any population and persecu-
tion on political grounds, aggression against authority and political op-
pression can constitute a crime against humanity if done in connection
with "any crime against peace or any war crime."
In the modem, post-Nuremberg setting, it has already been recog-
nized that a "war" of aggression is a crime against peace, 69 and that re-
gimes based on totalitarian ideologies and totalitarian practices can
jeopardize world peace and the leaders of such regimes should be crimi-
nally prosecuted.70 Furthermore, it has been recognized that apartheid
poses a "threat to international peace" and constitutes a crime against
humanity.71 Textwriters have also recognized that the use of force to
deprive a people of self-determination constitutes a crime against peace, a
67 See Paust, Political Oppression, supra note 44.
68 Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 374, at princ.
VI(c), adopted by the United Nations, [55th plen. mtg. 12/11/46], adopted by G.A. Res. 177 (II.)(a),
5 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 12) at 11-14, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950) (formulated by the International
Law Commission) [hereinafter cited as Nuremberg Charter and Judgment].
69 See id.. at princ. VI(a)(i); supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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realization based in part on authoritative declarations of the General As-
sembly.7" Any of these circumstances can also involve efforts by elites to
engage in acts of political oppression and aggression against authority.
To the extent that they are criminally sanctioned as crimes against peace,
the acts of oppression will be regulated.
More generally, however, a crime against peace should also be rec-
ognized whenever a violation of international law is of such serious mag-
nitude that it poses a significant threat to peace. The main concern in a
post-Nuremberg world is not merely with a war or threat of war between
nation-states. Numerous decisions of U.N. bodies and the writings of
scholars demonstrate that there is also a pervasive concern of the interna-
tional community with threats to peace that are posed by non-war ac-
tions and events. It is not unusual, for example, to discover a recognized
interdependence between peace and human rights, and that significant
deprivations of human rights can themselves result in a serious threat to
international peace.73 Where such a threat is reasonably foreseeable as a
result of serious violations of international law, as in the case of wide-
spread political oppression and aggression against authority, it is logical
and policy-serving to extend recognition of the concept of crimes against
peace to such a circumstance. Having done so, one might recognize that
such illegality constitutes a crime against humanity as well.
This is not actually a new approach to the problem posed by crimi-
nal actions violative of the law of the international community. As early
as the 1600s, Grotius recognized that crimes against the law of nations
are "offenses which affect human society at large ... and which other
states or their rulers have a right to deal with."7 4 Grotius had also recog-
nized the propriety of a "war" against a ruler who engages in a "manifest
oppression" of his or her people, noting that such a military response was
"undertaken to protect the subjects of another ruler from oppression"
and to assure that they are not further denied "the right of all human
society" to freedom from oppression." In that sense, "war" against the
72 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
73 M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, L. CHEN, supra note 48, at 139-40, 236 n.229, 320, 322-23
and references cited therein; McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawful-
ness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968); Paust, The Human Right to Participate,
supra note 4, at 580; Reisman, Responses to Crimes of Discrimination and Genocide: An Appraisal of
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, I DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 29, 33, 38-40,
55 (1971). See also, M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 50, at 5, and supra notes 70-71 and accompanying
text.
74 H. GROTIUS, II ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, chs. 18 (sec. 6), 21 (sec. 3) (F. Kelsey
trans. 1925).
75 Id. at ch. 25 (sec. 8). Importantly, this was not a war against the subjects of the ruler, but
against the ruler as such. Much later, in the nineteenth century, it was also recognized that local
alteration of a government could lead to a right of a foreign state to intervene in "such a clear case of
necessity as immediately affects its own independence, freedom, and security" or when necessity
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oppressor-ruler was a form of sanction strategy in response to acts of
oppression that could affect human society at large.
In 1793, Justice Wilson of the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a
slightly different interconnection between the process of peace and of-
fenses against the international community. While on circuit, Justice
Wilson recognized that if an offender against the law of nations is not
punished by his own nation such a circumstance can lead to reprisal and
even war. The Justice recognized that complicitous acts of aggression
"did interrupt, destroy, and break the said firm, inviolable, and universal
peace . . . [and offended] against the peace and dignity of the said
United States."76 When territorial rights were involved, the United
States early recognized that private violations of the law of nations can
constitute an act of "aggression" and a crime against "peace." 77 It is
logical that certain other violations of international law that pose a sig-
nificant threat to peace would be similarly categorized today.
The Draft Restatement also recognizes that a nation-state "may ex-
ercise jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses recognized by the
community of nations as of universal concern .. ."78 Significant
threats to the peace are obviously of a related concern when such threats
arise from serious violations of international law. Further guidance con-
tained in the draft is supportive of this general point and can be applied
in support of the more specific recognition made here that widespread
political oppression and aggression against authority are not only crimi-
nally sanctionable but should be related to crimes against peace and
crimes against humanity.79
In their seminal work on Law and Minimum World Public Order,
McDougal and Feliciano also note that the real question concerns the
impermissibility of coercion rather than the "technical characteriza-
involves "some contingent danger affecting the general security of nations." H. WHEATON, ELE-
MENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 120, 122 (3d ed. 1846). Such outside intervention could be per-
missible because sovereignty was not absolute and could not be exercised in a manner "inconsistent
with the equal rights of other States." Id. at 119-20.
76 Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1108-15, 1120 (Wilson, J., charge to grand jury and indict-
ment). In another early case, it was recognized that an assault on a foreign consul is a violation of
the law of nations and "a crime against the whole world" as well as "against the peace... of the
United States .. " Respublica v. DeLongchamps, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 1, 113, 115 (Pa. 1784).
77 See Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1108-15 (Wilson, J., charge to grand jury and indictment),
117 (points of Rawle, dist. atty: his "aggression" on them; "actual aggression is charged"). Accord I
Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797) ("the peace of Mankind"); I Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795) ("against the
public peace").
78 DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, at § 404.
79 The Draft Restatement adds: "Universal jurisdiction. . . is established in international law
as a result of universal condemnation of those activities and general interest in cooperating to sup-
press them, as reflected in widely-accepted international agreements and resolutions of international
organizations." Id. at Comment a to § 404 (emphasis added). For additional criteria recognized by
the International Law Commission, see supra notes 20, 38-39, 48. Cf McCaffrey, supra note 48.
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tions" of phrases such as "war of aggression, .... crimes against peace,"
"threats to the peace," or "threat or use of force," and that "[i]n the
framing of the United Nations Charter the deliberate choice was made to
keep these technical characterizations as ambiguous as they appear."" °
Instead of precise definitional exercises, they suggest attention be di-
rected to a range of "relevant factors in context which should rationally
affect decision.""1
Finally, in an effort to clarify relevant prohibitions of political op-
pression under international law, another affinity between the initiation
of a war of aggression and aggression against authority should be noted.
At Nuremberg, it was recognized that the initiation of a war of aggres-
sion is "the supreme international crime" because "it contains within it-
self the accumulated evil of the whole," including each resulting
individual international crime.82 Similarly, aggression against authority
"contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole," and when
peace is affected it is certainly no less dangerous and of no less import to
the international community.
V. SANCTION STRATEGIES IN RESPONSE
Many forms of sanction strategy are useable in response to aggres-
sion against authority, politicide, and the crime of oppression.83 The fol-
lowing are but a few worthy of comment.
A. Revolution and Self-Determination Assistance
In response to governmental oppression of authority, the people of a
given community have the right under international law to alter, abolish,
or overthrow any such form of government. 4 Such a government would
lack authority and could be overthrown in an effort to ensure authorita-
tive government, self-determination, and the human right to relatively
free and equal individual participation in the political process. A re-
80 M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 61-62
(1961).
81 Id. at 61-63. For a suggested set of interrelated factors, see id. at 63-67.
82 Opinion and Judgment in NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, quoted in M. McDOUGAL
& F. FELICIANO, supra note 80, at 60-61 n.144.
83 For further guidance, see M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 80, at 309-33 (discus-
sion and catalog of various sanction strategies); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra
note 48, at 219-48, 278-99; Paust, Response to Terrorism: A Prologue to Decision Concerning Private
Measures of Sanction, 12 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 79 (1977). The Strategies which follow are all cat-
egorizable under the military or policing function. Others might include use of economic, diplo-
matic or ideologic strategies addressed in the cited works.
84 For an historical perspective, see Paust, The Human Right to Participate, supra note 4, at
560-79 and references cited therein.
85 Id. at 562-67.
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gime contrary to the authority of the people is actually an illegal regime
seeking to exercise power in violation of several interrelated international
precepts. Hence, it has no right under international law to assure its
survival.86
Moreover, under international law, the effort of a given people to
reestablish authority and political self-determination may be supported
by other nation-states through the express right to self-determination
assistance, a right tied to authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Char-
ter.87 In the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law, for
example, the General Assembly affirmed the right to self-determination
assistance: "In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible ac-
tion in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such
peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter. ' '8 8  Subsequently, numerous
other U.N. decisions have affirmed the right to self-determination assist-
ance in specific contexts. 89 Interestingly, at the time of the American
Revolution it was recognized that armed revolution is a form of "self-
defense" for an oppressed people, a recognition that is still worthy of our
attention.90
B. Tyrannicide
In the past, there have been claims that tyrannicide can be part of a
lawful strategy in response to political oppression. 91 Today, however, it
86 See Paust, Political Oppression, supra note 44, at 180-88 and references cited therein.
87 Paust & Blaustein, supra note 15, at 11-12 n.39, 19, 20 n.69, 31, 38. See also M. McDou-
GAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 48, at 236-45 and references cited therein; W. REISMAN,
NULLITY AND REVISION 836-58 (1971); Reisman, The United Nations Charter and the Use of Force:
Is Article 2(4) Still Workable?, 78 Ppoc. AM. SOC. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1984) (panel discussion).
The use of force recognized as early as Grotius to protect such a people from oppression is also of
historic precedent. See supra note 75 and accompany text.
88 Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra note 29. See also 1974 Definition of
Aggression, supra note 20.
89 Paust, Illegality of Apartheid, supra note 47. In the context of the emergence of the new
state of Bangladesh it was written:
Contextual reality and the serving of all goal values require a new reading of article 51 of
the Charter as well, for as a people undergoing the peaceful process of self-determination
within an entity find that they must seek it without that entity due to a military crackdown,
they should be entitled to self-defense and collective self-defense within the full ambit of
...the Charter. . . .[W]here an armed attack has occurred against a people seeking self-
determination it is not improper to assist those being attacked.
Paust & Blaustein, supra note 15, at 11-12 n.39. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, paras. 2, 3, art. 2, para.
4, art. 51. See also Falk, The Decline of Normative Restraint in International Relations, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 263, 269 (1985) (Force to aid self-determination in Afghanistan).
90 See, e.g., Paust, The Human Right to Participate, supra note 4, at 568, 568 n.88.
91 See Kutner, A Philosophical Perspective on Rebellion in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND
POLITICAL CRIMES 51, 52-61 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1975) and references cited therein; Zlataric, HIS-
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is generally recognized that assassination is impermissible,92 and some
allege that it constitutes an impermissible strategy of terrorism. 93 Never-
theless, the mere assassination of a political official without attempting to
produce intense fear or anxiety (i.e., a terror outcome) in a particular
target group is not properly classifiable as an act of terrorism.94 Such an
act aims merely at the elimination of a political elite and one can ques-
tion today whether such an act, when reasonably necessary to oppose
aggression against authority and the crime of political oppression, can be
part of a permissible responsive strategy. Since assassination usually in-
volves "conviction" and "sentencing" without trial, significant human
rights are at stake and it may well be that if tyrannicide is ever viewed
again as being permissible, it will constitute the only permitted form of
assassination.
With respect to state-sponsored tyrannicide, it is also worth noting
that, as in Grotius' time,95 such a use of force may not offend interna-
tional norms proscribing certain uses of armed force. For example, the
use of force against a tyrant arguably may be permissible under the U.N.
Charter if it is not used against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of another state, but to assure freedom from oppression, self-
determination, and the human rights of the people within such a state.96
In a given circumstance, such force may be reasonably necessary and
proportionate whether or not it is used in conjunction with local strate-
gies of violence designed to assure the same outcomes. On balance, it
may be consistent with other fundamental purposes of the U.N. Charter.
One can still question whether Hitler should have been assassinated in
order to avoid more genocide and World War II, even knowing that the
assassination of the Archduke of Austria contributed to World War I.
Propriety would depend in part upon context. It is also important to
TORY OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND ITS LEGAL CONTROL in Id. at 474, 477. See also supra
note 75 and accompanying text.
92 Paust, My Lai and Vietnam, supra note 8, at 143-46 and references cited therein; Paust, Is
the President Bound by the Supreme Law of the Land?-Foreign Affairs and National Security Reex-
amined, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 719, 759, 759n. 165 (1982). For an early recognition of the
prohibition of assassination, see I Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 515 (1821) (quoting E. DEVATTEL, LAW OF
NATIONS). But see H. GROTIUS, supra note 74 ("war" against a tyrant).
93 A. Evans & J. Murphy, supra note 59, at 411-12, 605; INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: NA-
TIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 5, 57, 85-86, 125, 296, 329 (Y. Alexander ed.
1976); TERRORISM: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 7-10, 12, 32-36, 50-52, 66-67, 83, 94-98,
101, 109, 111, 188, 248, 292 (Y. Alexander & S. Finger eds. 1977). It can of course be part of a
strategy of terrorism. Paust, Response to Terrorism: 4 Prologue to Decision Concerning Private
Measures of Sanction, 12 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 79, 115 (1977).
94 For a relevant definitional approach to terrorism, see Paust, Response to Terrorism, supra
note 93, at 81; Paust, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 192-93.
95 Supra note 75 and accompanying text.
96 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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note that policy-thwarting consequences can flow from inaction just as
readily as from action.
Tyrannicide may even be viewed as a form of punishment for past
violations of international law, and thus as a use of force that is engaged
in on behalf of the international community when international institu-
tions are unable effectively to act. As such, it would not be directed
against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state.
Force would be used to assure the enforcement of international criminal
law, a law which is basically dependent upon enforcement by nation-
states acting on behalf of the community in a context where there is no
world police force, criminal court or jail. The elimination of a tyrant
without trial as a defense against future oppression, however, may appear
to be more acceptable than elimination as punishment. Nevertheless, the
question of the permissibility of limited force used to enforce interna-
tional criminal law is intriguing.
97
97 In my opinion, this was one of the questions involved in the recent U.S. diversion of an
Egyptian aircraft to Italy. Such a very limited use of force was arguably reasonably necessary and
proportionate under the circumstances to assure the enforcement of international criminal law on
behalf of the community. It was not directed against Egyptian territorial or political independence
as such and, on balance, it was arguably consistent with the purposes of the Charter. As such, the
action was not violative of article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter or article 14 of the 1979 International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 55. The diversion of the aircraft seemed all
the more necessary because Egypt had refused to take those accused of hijacking the Italian vessel
Achille Lauro into custody and to prosecute or extradite them to a country that would do so. Had
Egypt ratified the Hostages Convention, its refusal would have violated articles 5, 6 and 8 of the
Convention. If Egypt did not secretly consent to the U.S. enforcement effort, could the U.S. engage
in such action to aid in the enforcement of Egyptian obligations when Egypt could not or would not
do so? Several of my colleagues argued initially that the U.S. action was impermissible. See, eg.
(quotes of Vagts and Higgins) in, "Scholars Dispute U.S. Right to Intercept Plane," Houston Post,
Oct. 12, 1985, at A 22, col. 2; c.f Falk, The Danger of Flouting the World Court, Newsday, Nov. 3,
1985, at 1, 10, col. 4. By analogy, the U.S. action may also have been equivalent to the control of
foreign ships on the high seas on reasonable suspicion that international law has been violated, an
action permitted initially in part to assure sanctions against international crime. See, e.g. La Jeune
Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 842-43 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15, 551); See also Church v. Hubbart, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234-36 (1804); 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 456 (1860); Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of
the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L. J. 774, 787-91 (1976). It may also be arguably related to a process of self-
defense (i.e., in order to defend against continuous actions of the alleged terrorists).
Finally, although distinguishable from the kidnapping of Eichmann within Argentine territory
(and thus the use of "police" force within foreign territory without foreign state consent), the control
or coercion of an aircraft containing alleged international criminals and the kidnapping (or "interna-
tional criminal kidnapping"?) of Eichmann do raise similar issues. In the case of Eichmann, Israel
expressed regret without admitting direct involvement in his seizure, but Israel went on with the trial
of Eichmann, who was subsequently prosecuted and hung. See N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEE-
NEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 51-52 (1973); L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER &
H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 449-51 (1980). On the use of "police" force abroad, see also United
States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1974), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974);
Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 433 (1902); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 362, 370-71
(1824); Goldie, Legal Aspects of the Refusal of Asylum by U.S. Coast Guard on 23 November 1970, 23
NAVAL WAR C. REV. 32, 33-35 (1971).
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C. Criminal Prosecution in the U.S.
One sanction strategy implicit in this symposial effort involves the
use of criminal sanctions against individual violators of international law.
As noted above, there is universal jurisdiction over violations of interna-
tional law. 98 Moreover, universal enforcement jurisdiction has been ex-
ercised in the United States since the dawn of our constitutional
history.99 Although prosecutions of individual violators of international
law have occurred in the absence of a federal statute, it is now generally
assumed that a statute is needed to impose domestic criminal
sanctions. oo
Some federal laws can be used to reach certain aspects of aggression
against authority and political oppression. However, new federal legisla-
tion is needed in order to assure adequate competence to criminally sanc-
tion all aspects of international illegality. Ratification of the Genocide
Convention and adoption of relevant implementing legislation would aid
in covering certain gaps in domestic law, yet more is needed. Federal
legislation to impose sanctions against aggression in violation of interna-
tional law, or the crime of oppression, would not be necessary if Congress
amended Title 18 of the United States Code to create an offense against
human rights.10 1 Such a statute is long overdue and would cover rele-
vant conduct. Indeed, so long after Nuremberg, it is shocking that the
United States is so ill-prepared to criminally sanction illegal aggression,
crimes against peace, genocide, and violations of fundamental human
rights. On this fortieth anniversary of Nuremberg it is time for Congress
to act.
It is also worth noting, however, contrary to false myth, that the
United States has the competence under federal law to prosecute any war
crime either in a federal district court or an ad hoe military commis-
98 DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, at § 404, Comments a, b thereto; see Paust, Federal
Jurisdiction, supra note 9.
99 Paust, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 211-13.
100 Id. at 212-13, 220 and references cited therein.
101 See Offenses Against Human Rights, 18 U.S.C. § 116 (Draft); Paust, Federal Jurisdiction,
supra note 9, at 215-16, 250. The draft legislation should also be supplemented to provide that any
real or personal property acquired from relevant violations of international law, or substituted there-
fore, shall be confiscated for the nation-state in which such deprivations took place or that represents
the nationals who were victims of such deprivations. This confiscation would be subject to the right
of private victims to recover their property and to sue for and collect money damages for any rele-
vant violation of international law. On this general point, see also Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v.
Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982); Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 49 Misc.2d 300 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y.Co. 1966), modified on other grounds, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Ist Dept. 1967), modification rev'd, 24
N.Y.2d 91, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979, 246 N.E.2d 742 (1969); Rosenberg v. Fischer, 15 Ann. Dig. 467
(Switzerland Fed. Trib. 1948); The Steamship Appam, 243 U.S. 124, 149-56 (1917); The Santissima
Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 354 (1822); Draft Brief, supra note 13.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
sion.10 2 For example, former Nazi war criminals can be prosecuted in
the United States if the executive branch has the political will to prose-
cute such persons instead of seeking merely to deport them or, as some
allege, to let them remain free. 103 Certainly when illegal aggression, ge-
nocide, and violations of human rights (including the right to self-deter-
mination, to participate in the political process, and thus to freedom
from political oppression) occur in connection with violations of the law
of war, they can be reached through prosecutions of war crimes. Yet,
not all forms of aggression against authority and political oppression oc-
cur in time of war. Thus, new federal legislation is needed to enable the
United States more adequately to fulfill its international responsibility to
prosecute or extradite those persons reasonably accused of having com-
mitted international crime under customary or treaty-based law."
D. Civil Sanctions Through Civil Suits
Civil suits in U.S. courts for violations of international law, espe-
cially human rights, are available and entirely appropriate. 0 5 Further-
more, there is no immunity for governmental violators of international
law.106 To the extent that civil sanctions are utilized, they can aid in the
overall effort to assure democratic authority, self-determination, and the
enjoyment by all persons of their fundamental human rights.
To deny such a remedy would thwart the overall effort and would
instead support the oppression of people and their rights under interna-
tional law. A free and independent legal profession cannot afford to tol-
erate this outcome. Quite understandably, judicial tolerance of relevant
violations of international law was criminally sanctioned at subsequent
Nuremberg proceedings.10 7 The precedent can reach to ourselves. 08
102 See Paust, After My Lai, supra note 15, at 10-11 and references cited therein.
103 For a general discussion of United States treatment of Nazi war criminals in the U.S., see
Lippman, The Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals in the United States: Is Justice Being Served?,
7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169 (1985); Moeller, United States Treatment of Alleged Nazi War Criminals:
International Law, Immigration Law and the Need for International Cooperation, 25 VA. J. INT'L L.
793 (1985).
104 On this international responsibility, see M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 50, at 24; A. EVANS & J.
MURPHY, supra note 59, at xxxiii-xxxiv, 303, 485-87, 493, 503, 509, 657; Paust, Federal Jurisdiction,
supra note 9, at 195-96, 226-29 and references cited therein.
105 See, J. PAUST, supra note 2; Paust, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 211-15. On the
propriety of civil sanctions for genocide, see L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 65, at 928-29.
106 Draft Brief supra note 13; Paust, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 221-49.
107 See The Justice Case (U.S. v. Altstoetter), III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NURNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 3 (1950).
108 For a relevant warning two hundred years ago by Thomas Paine, see 2 THE COMPLETE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE (P. Foner ed. 1945). "He that would make his own liberty secure
must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent
that will reach to himself." Id. at 588.
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VI. CONCLUSION
When Jacob Bronowski wrote, in The Ascent of Man, of the tyrant's
counter-conception of "monstrous certainty" and "the betrayal of the
human spirit: the assertion of dogma that closes the mind, and turns a
nation, a civilization, into a regiment of ghosts-obedient ghosts, or tor-
tured ghosts," 0 9 he might just as well have written about the effects of an
extended aggression against authority and a treason against humanity,
for they are the same. Such effects may have been addressed only partly
at Nuremberg, but today one can recognize that aggression against au-
thority and political oppression are violative of international law and can
be responded to with various sanction strategies, including criminal pros-
ecution. Finally, a free and independent legal profession cannot afford to
join the "regiment of ghosts," but must ever strive to promote authority,
self-determination, human rights and human dignity in opposition to the
crime of oppression.
"We are able to do away with domestic tyranny and violence and
aggression by those in power against the rights of their own people only
when we make all men answerable to law."110
109 J. BRONOVSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 367, 370 (1973).
110 INT'S MILIT. TRIB. THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 49-50 (1946). Mr.
Jackson as chief prosecutor at Nuremberg.
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ANNEX
Draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Politicide.
PREAMBLE
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES,
Having Considered the recognition of the International Law Com-
mission in its 1979 Draft Articles on State Responsibility that actions
against self-determination can be criminally sanctioned;
Recognizing that aggression against authority is incompatible with
international legal precepts of self-determination and human rights, in-
cluding the human right of all persons to participate in the political
processes of their society and to a governmental process based on the
authority of the people as guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights;
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United
Nations to respect and observe human rights as well as the precept of
self-determination;
Recognizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals
and to the community to which he or she belongs, is also under a respon-
sibility to respect and observe human rights law;
Being Concerned that serious acts of political oppression continue to
thwart the right of peoples to self-determination, the process of legiti-
mate authority of governments, and the interrelated human rights of per-
sons, and that serious crimes of oppression have gone unpunished;
HEREBY AGREE:
Article I
The Contracting Parties confirm that politicide, whether committed
in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law
which they undertake to prevent and to punish.
Article II
In the present Convention, politicide means, at least, any of the fol-
lowing acts committed with an intent politically to oppress, in whole or
in part, any human group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Terrorizing members of the group;
(c) Kidnapping, incarcerating or arbitrarily restricting the move-
ment of members of the group;
(d) Torturing or causing other serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group;
(e) Arbitrarily restricting access of any members of the group to
the media;
Vol. 18:283
AGGRESSION AGAINST AUTHORITY
(f) Imposing other measures intended to prevent a relatively free
participation by members of the group in a political process.
Article III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Politicide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit politicide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit politicide;
(d) Attempt to commit politicide;
(e) Complicity in politicide.
Article IV
Persons committing politicide or any of the other acts enumerated
in Article III shall be punished upon conviction, whether they are consti-
tutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals. There
shall be no form of immunity with regard to the prohibited acts.
Article V
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with
their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to
the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide
severe and effective penalties for persons guilty of politicide or of any of
the other acts enumerated in Article III.
Article VI
1. Persons charged with politicide or any of the other acts enumer-
ated in Article III can be tried by a competent tribunal of any State,
given the universal nature of jurisdiction over human rights violations, or
by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect
to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
2. Any Contracting Party that has within its territory any person
reasonably accused of having committed any of the above acts shall, if it
does not extradite such person, be obliged, without exception whatso-
ever, to take such person into custody and submit the case to its compe-
tent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall
take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary
offense of a serious nature under the law of that state.
Article VII
1. Politicide and the other acts enumerated in Article III shall not
be considered as political crimes for the purposes of extradition.
2. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to
grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.
3. The offenses listed in Article III shall be deemed to be included
as extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty existing between Con-
tracting Parties or Parties may, at their option, consider this Convention
as the legal basis for extradition for such offenses. Contracting Parties
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undertake to include the offenses as extraditable offenses in every future
extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
Article VIII
The Contracting Parties shall also assure that effective civil remedies
-are available, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, to the
victims of offenses listed in Article III, including effective remedies
against the perpetrators of such offenses who may be found within their
territory in accordance with the right to an effective remedy guaranteed
in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Article IX, and so forth [as appropriately amended from Articles
VIII to XIX of the Genocide Convention, if not also from treaties such
as the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, 24 U.S.T. 564].
